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The universal blind quantum computation protocol (UBQC) [1] enables an almost classical client
to delegate a quantum computation to an untrusted quantum server (in form of a garbled quantum
computation) while the security for the client is unconditional. In this contribution we explore the
possibility of extending the verifiable UBQC [2, 3], to achieve further functionalities as was done for
classical garbled computation. First, exploring the asymmetric nature of UBQC (client preparing
only single qubits, while the server runs the entire quantum computation), we present a “Yao”
type protocol for secure two party quantum computation. Similar to the classical setting [4] our
quantum Yao protocol is secure against a specious (quantum honest-but-curious) garbler, but in our
case, against a (fully) malicious evaluator. Unlike the protocol in [5], we do not require any online-
quantum communication between the garbler and the evaluator and thus no extra cryptographic
primitive. This feature will allow us to construct a simple universal one-time compiler for any
quantum computation using one-time memory, in a similar way with the classical work of [6] while
more efficiently than the previous work of [7].
I. INTRODUCTION
Future information and communication networks will consist of both classical and quantum devices, some
of which are expected to be dishonest. These devices will have various different functionalities, ranging
from simple routers to servers executing quantum algorithms. Within the last few years, anticipating this
development has led to the formation and growth of the field of delegated quantum computing [1, 7–11].
Among them is the universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) protocol of [1] which is developed based
on the measurement-based quantum computation model (MBQC) [12] that appears as the most promising
physical implementation for a networked architecture [13]. In the UBQC framework, the only quantum
requirement for the client is the offline creation of random single qubit states, which is a currently available
technology, and has been demonstrated experimentally [14].
The MBQC model of computation, can be viewed as a set of classical instructions steering a quantum
computation performed on a highly entangled quantum state. The classical outcomes of the single-system
measurements that occur during the computation, are in general randomly distributed bits with no signifi-
cance for the final output of the computation. This enables one to use relatively basic obfuscation techniques
in order to prevent an untrusted operator, implementing an MBQC computation, to access the true flow of
information. This key observation has led to an entirely new approach to quantum verification that exploits
cryptographic techniques [2, 10, 11, 15–21]. The core idea is to encode simple trap computations within a
target computation, run on a remote device. This is done in such a way that the computation is not affected,
while in the same time, reveals no information to the server. The correctness of the overall computation is
tested by verifying that the trap computations were done correctly. The latter, being significantly less costly,
leads to efficient verification schemes. This approach of quantum verification has been recently used to ob-
tain specific cryptographic primitives such as quantum one-time program [7] and secure two-party quantum
computation [22], that are also the main focus of this paper.
A. Our contribution
We will explore two extensions of the verifiable universal blind quantum computing (VUBQC) protocols,
that are build based on measurement-based quantum computation, in order to achieve new functionalities to
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2be implemented in the quantum network setting [13]. The essential novelty of our approach is that the client-
server setting allows different participants to have different quantum technological requirements. As a result,
in our proposed two-party primitives, one party (garbler or sender) remains as classical as possible (with no
need for quantum memory), while it is only the other party (evaluator or receiver) that requires access to a
quantum computer. Moreover, the required offline initial quantum communication between the participants
is also limited to exchange of simple single quantum states that can be generated, for example, in any
quantum key distribution network (as it was proven recently in [23]). Finally, all the utilised sub-protocols
in our schemes could be reduced to the core protocols of offline preparation [23] and verifiable universal blind
quantum computation [2, 18] that are both proven to be composably secure in the abstract cryptography
framework of [24]. For simplicity, we only present the stand-alone security proof for our protocols, as we
follow the framework of [5] and use simulation-based techniques. Concretely we present two new protocols:
1. In Section III we present a protocol for secure two party quantum computation, that we refer to as
QYao. This protocol involves two parties with asymmetric roles, that wish to securely compute any
given unitary on a joint quantum input. Similar to the classical protocol of [4], in QYao an honest-
but-curious (formally defined for the quantum setting in [5]) client, capable of preparing only random
single qubit and performing constant depth classical computation, “garbles” the entire unitary. The
fully malicious server/evaluator, receives instructions from garbler and insert their input either using a
(classical) oblivious transfer (OT), or by a quantum input insertion scheme secure against the honest-
but-curious garbler. The evaluator performs the computation, extracts their own output qubits and
returns the remaining output qubits to the garbler. After the garbler verifies the computation, the
garbler releases the encryption keys of the evaluator output qubits. Unlike the classical setting, our
proposed QYao protocol is interactive, but importantly, only classical online communication is required.
One gain we obtain, is a boost in security since, apart from the initial input exchange where classical
OT is needed, the rest of the protocol is unconditionally secure. If one could replace the classical OT’s
in our QYao protocol with new primitives, such as the unconditionally secure relativistic primitives
[25], the security would be extended to fully unconditional. In Section IV we prove the security of the
protocol in the ideal-real word paradigm using a simulation-based technique.
2. In Section V we follow the classical approach of [6] and make our QYao protocol non-interactive by
using the classical hardware primitive “one-time memory” (OTM), which is essentially a non-interactive
oblivious transfer. By using OTM the need for initial OT calls, in our QYao protocol, is also removed
leading to a one-time universal compiler for any given quantum computation. Such one-time quantum
programs can be executed only once, where the input can be chosen at any time. The one-time
programs have a wide range of applications ranging from program obfuscation, software protection to
temporary transfer of cryptographic ability [6]. Classically the challenge in lifting the Yao protocol for
two-party computation to one-time program, is addressing the issue of malicious adversary. However,
our QYao protocol is already secure against a malicious evaluator without any extra primitive or added
overhead. Our quantum one-time program is therefore a straightforward translation of QYao. The
same technique is applicable to essentially any cryptographic protocols developed in the measurement-
based model that require offline quantum preparation and online classical communications. In any such
MBQC computation there are exponentially many branches of computation (this is due to the non-
deterministic nature of the intermediate single-qubits measurement that occur during the computation).
However, we prove that a single OTM (of constant size) per computation qubit suffices to make the
QYao non-interactive. This is due to the fact that in any constant degree graph-state (the underlying
entanglement resources for an MBQC computation), the flow of information acts locally. We prove that
this is the case for the recourse in the VUBQC protocol introduced in [3], that our protocol is based.
Hence each classical message between parties, in the interactive case, depends on constant number of
previous messages which allows us to remove this interaction using a simple constant-size OTM.
B. Related works
Deriving new quantum cryptographic protocols for functionalities beyond the secure key exchange [26]
is an active field of research (see a recent review for a summary [27]). In particular, our contributions
are directly linked to the works on verifiable blind quantum computing (VUBQC) [2, 10, 11], secure two
party quantum computing [5, 22] and quantum one-time program and quantum obfuscation [7, 28]. The
3main focus in VUBQC research is the ability of a limited verifier to certify the correctness of the quantum
computation performed by a remote server. Recently, many such protocols have been developed achieving
different quantum technological requirement for the verifier or the prover [15, 17, 19, 29, 30]. We have
used the optimal (from the verifier point of view) VUBQC that has the additional property of a local and
independent trap construction [3]. This property allows us to construct a simple yet generic scheme for the
server (receiver, evaluator) input insertion and output extraction that could be applicable to other VUBQC
schemes and that might lead to further properties not present in the scheme of [3].
Due to the impossibility results of [7, 28], having extra primitives such as OTM is unavoidable in order to
achieve program hiding. However, using the MBQC framework with the verification protocol of [3] leads to
a simpler procedure for removing the classical interaction compared to the initial work that pioneered this
approach [7]. Furthermore, due to the direct utilisation of OTM’s instead of classical one-time programs,
our scheme could be applicable to other VUBQC protocols that might emerge in the future. Another way
making protocols non-interactive is based on the security of other classical primitives as it was done in [31]
using fully homomorphic encryption. However, to apply this method for non-interactive secure two-party
quantum computation, is important to enable verifiability from the side of the sender, something naturally
present in our scheme but not necessarily in other schemes. Finally the VUBQC framework which naturally
separates the classical and quantum part of the computation allows us to construct a client-server scheme
for secure two-party quantum computation that unlike the work of [5] removes the requirement of any extra
cryptographic primitive that was an open question in [5]. Here, we need to clarify that, while in the classical
Yao with an honest-but-curious garbler the primitive of OT is required for the evaluator’s input insertion, in
our QYao this is not the case. This is simply due to the fact that the notion of quantum specious adversary
that was formalised in [5] is more restrictive than classical honest-but-curious in certain cases (see Appendix
B). Hence instead of utilising a classical OT, one could simply devise a quantum communication scheme,
as we present here, in order to achieve the same goal of secure input insertion against a (less powerful)
adversarial garbler.
Finally, the server - client setting can also be exploited to achieve simpler (implementation-wise) multiparty
blind quantum computation protocols, where multiple clients use a single server to jointly and securely
perform a quantum computation [32].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Verifiable blind quantum computation
We will assume that the reader is familiar with the measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
model [12] that is known to be the same as any gate teleportation model [33, 34]. In this section we
introduce MBQC and use it to revise a blind quantum computation (server performs computation without
learning input/output or computation) [1] and a verifiable blind quantum computation (client can also verify
that the computation was performed correctly) [2] protocols. The general idea behind the MBQC model
is: start with a large and highly entangled generic multiparty state (the resource state) and then perform
the computation by carrying out single-qubit measurements. To perform a desired quantum computation,
each qubit should be measured in a suitable basis, and this basis is (partly) determined by some default
measurement angles φi. There is an order that the measurements should occur which is determined by the
flow of the computation (see also later), and the basis that each qubit is measured generally depends on
the outcomes of previous measurements (and the default measurement angle φi). The resource states used
are known as graph states as they can be fully determined by a given graph (see details in [35]). A way to
construct a graph state given the graph description is to assign to each vertex of the graph a qubit initially
prepared in the state |+〉 and for each edge of the graph to perform a controlled−Z gate to the two adjacent
vertices. For completeness, in Appendix A we give the expression for the measurement angles of each qubit,
and an example of measurement pattern (graph state and default measurement angles φi) that implement
each gate from a universal set of gates.
If one starts with a graph state where qubits are prepared in a rotated basis |+θ〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 + eiθ |1〉)
instead, then it is possible to perform the same computation with the non-rotated graph state by preforming
measurements in a similarly rotated basis. This observation led to the formulation of the universal blind
quantum computation (UBQC) protocol [1] which hides the computation in a client-server setting. Here
a client prepares rotated qubits, where the rotation is only known to them. The client sends the qubits
4to the server, as soon as they are prepared (hence there is no need for any quantum memory). Finally,
the client instructs the server to perform entangling operations according to the graph and to carry out
single qubits measurements in suitable angles in order to complete the desired computation (where an extra
randomisation ri of the outcome of the measurements is added). During the protocol the client receives the
outcomes of previous measurements and can classically evaluate the next measurement angles. Due to the
unknown rotation and the extra outcome randomisation, the server does not learn what computation they
actually perform.
The UBQC protocol can be uplifted to a verification protocol where the client can detect a cheating server.
To do so, the client for certain vertices (called dummies) sends states from the set {|0〉 , |1〉} which has the
same effect as a Z-basis measurement on that vertex. In any graph state if a vertex is measured in the Z-
basis it results in a new graph where that vertex and all its adjacent edges are removed. During the protocol
the server does not know for a particular vertex if the client sent a dummy qubit or not. This enables the
client to isolate some qubits (disentangled from the rest of the graph). Those qubits have fixed deterministic
outcomes if the server followed honestly the instructions. The positions of those isolated qubits are unknown
to the server and the client uses them as traps to test that the server performs the quantum operations that
is requested. This technique led to the first universal VUBQC protocol [2] and was subsequently extended to
many other protocols depending on what optimised construction was used, what was the required quantum
technology and which was the desired level of security. It is clear that the more (independent) traps we have
within a graph, the higher the probability of detecting a deviation. In [3] the authors gave a construction
that, while maintaining an overhead which is linear in the size of the input, introduced multiple traps and in
particular of the same number as the computation qubits. We will be using that construction, not only for
efficiency reasons, but because this construction is “local”, and revealing to the server partial information
about the graph does not compromise the security. This is important for our QYao protocol, since in this
case, the server has input and output, and needs to know in which parts of the graph their input/output
belongs. The construction is summarised below:
1. We are given a base-graph G that has vertices v ∈ V (G) and edges e ∈ E(G).
2. For each vertex vi, we define a set of three new vertices Pvi = {pvi1 , pvi3 , pvi3 }. These are called primary
vertices.
3. Corresponding to each edge e(vi, vj) ∈ E(G) of the base-graph that connects the base vertices vi and
vj , we introduce a set of nine edges Ee(vi,vj) that connect each of the vertices in the set Pvi with each
of the vertices in the set Pvj .
4. We replace every edge in the resulted graph with a new vertex connected to the two vertices originally
joined by that edge. The new vertices added in this step are called added vertices. This is the dotted
triple-graph DT (G).
We can see (Figure 1) that each vertex in the DT (G), corresponds to either a vertex (for primary vertices)
or an edge (for added vertices) of the base-graph. The precise edge/vertex of the base-graph that each
vertex v ∈ DT (G) belongs is called base-location. The nice property of this graph, is that one can reduce
this graph to three copies of the base-graph by “breaking” some edges (which can be done using dummy
qubits). Moreover, the choice of which vertex belongs to each of the three graphs, is essentially independent
(for different base-locations corresponding to vertices of the base-graph). With this construction, we can
eventually use one copy of the base-graph for the computation, while make multiple single traps from the two
remaining copies (see Figure 1). The choice of which vertex belongs to which graph is called trap-colouring.
This is a free choice made by the client, and the fact that the server is ignorant of the actual trap-colouring
guarantees the security (see details in [3]).
Definition 1 (Trap-Colouring). We define trap-colouring to be an assignment of one colour to each of the
vertices of the dotted triple-graph that is consistent with the following conditions.
(i) Primary vertices are coloured in one of the three colours white or black (for traps), and green (for
computation). There is an exception for input base-locations (see step (v)).
(ii) Added vertices are coloured in one of the four colours white, black, green or red.
(iii) In each primary set Pv there is exactly one vertex of each colour.
5(iv) Colouring the primary vertices fixes the colours of the added vertices: Added vertices that connect
primary vertices of different colour are red. Added vertices that connect primary vertices of the same
colour get that colour.
(v) For input base-locations, instead of green we have a blue vertex (but all other rules, including how is
connected with the other vertices apply in the same way as if it was green).
Figure 1. Dotted-triple-graph. Circles: primary vertices with base-location of vertex of the base-graph; Squares:
added vertices with base-location of edges of the base-graph. (a) Trap-colouring. Blue: input qubits; Green: gate
qubits; White/black: trap qubits; Red: wiring qubits. Client chooses the colours randomly for each vertex with
base-location of vertex of the base-graph and prepares each qubit individually before sending them one by one to the
server to entangle them according to the generic construction. (b) After entangling, the breaking operation defined
by the wiring qubits will reduce the graph in (a) to the computation graph and for each vertex a corresponding
trap/tag qubits.
For completeness we give the basic verification protocol from [3] that we use.
Protocol 1 Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation using dotted triple-graph (with Fault-tolerant
Encoding) - Taken from [3]
A standard labelling of vertices of the dotted triple-graph DT (G) is known to both client and server.
The number of qubits is at most 3N(3c+ 1) where c is the maximum degree of the base graph G.
• Client’s resources
– Client is given a base graph G. The corresponding dotted graph state |D(G)〉 is generated by graph D(G) that is
obtained from G by replacing every edge with a new vertex connected to the two vertices originally joined by that
edge.
– Client is given an MBQC measurement pattern MComp which: Applied on the dotted graph state |D(G)〉 performs
the desired computation, in a fault-tolerant way, that can detect or correct errors fewer than δ/2.
– Client generates the dotted triple-graph DT (G), and selects a trap-colouring according to definition 1 which is done
by choosing independently the colours for each set Pv.
– Client for all red vertices will send dummy qubits and thus performs break operation.
– Client chooses the green graph to perform the computation.
– Client for the white graph sends dummy qubits for all added qubits aew and thus generates white isolated qubits at
each primary vertex set Pv. Similarly for the black graph the client sends dummy qubits for the primary qubits p
v
b
and thus generates black isolated qubits at each added vertex set Ae.
– The dummy qubits position set D is chosen as defined above (fixed by the trap-colouring).
– A binary string s of length at most 3N(3c+ 1) represents the measurement outcomes. It is initially set to all zero’s.
– A sequence of measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤3N(3c+1) with φi ∈ A = {0, pi/4, · · · , 7pi/4}, consistent with MComp.
We define φ′i(φi, s) to be the measurement angle in MBQC, when corrections due to previous measurement outcomes
s are taken into account (the function depends on the specific base-graph and its flow, see e.g. [1]). We also set φ′i = 0
for all the trap and dummy qubits. The Client chooses a measurement order on the dotted base-graph D(G) that is
consistent with the flow of the computation (this is known to Server). The measurements within each set Pv, Ae of
DT (G) graph are ordered randomly.
– 3N(3c+ 1) random variables θi with value taken uniformly at random from A.
– 3N(3c+ 1) random variables ri and |D| random variable di with values taken uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) = φ
′
i(φi, s) + θi + piri that for each non-output qubit i computes the angle of the
measurement of qubit i to be sent to the Server.
– Continues
6Protocol 2 continuing: VUBQC with DT(G)
• Initial Step
– Client’s move: Client sets all the value in s to be 0 and prepares the input qubits as
|e〉 = Xx1Z(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗XxlZ(θl) |I〉
and the remaining qubits in the following form
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉
and sends the Server all the 3N(3c+ 1) qubits in the order of the labelling of the vertices of the graph.
– Server’s move: Server receives 3N(3c+ 1) single qubits and entangles them according to DT (G).
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3N(3c+ 1)
– Client’s move: Client computes the angle δi = C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and sends it to the Server.
– Server’s move: Server measures qubit i with angle δi and sends the Client the result bi.
– Client’s move: Client sets the value of si in s to be bi + ri.
• Final Step:
– Server’s move: Server returns the last layer of qubits (output layer) to the Client.
• Verification
– After obtaining the output qubits from the Server, the Client measures the output trap qubits with angle δt = θt+rtpi
to obtain bt.
– Client accepts if bi = ri for all the white (primary) and black (added) trap qubits i.
B. Two-party quantum protocols
The impossibility of achieving unconditionally secure two-party cryptographic protocols has led to the
definition and use of simpler hardware or software primitives to form the basis for the desired functionalities.
A one out of n oblivious transfer (OT) is a two party protocol where one party (Alice) has input n messages
(x1, · · · , xn) and the other party (Bob) inputs a number c ∈ {1, · · · , n} and receives the message xc with
the following guarantees: Bob learns nothing about the other messages xi|i 6= c and Alice is “oblivious”
(does not know) which message Bob obtained (i.e. does not know the value c) [36]. A hardware token that
implements a non-interactive OT is called one-time-memory (OTM) [6]. We will utilise a one out of n OTM,
where again Alice stores in the OTM n strings (x1, · · · , xn), Bob specifies a value c and the OTM reveals xc
to Bob and then self-destructs: i.e. the remaining strings xi|i 6= c are lost forever.
The first paper that studied secure two party quantum computation is [5] and we follow their notations and
conventions. We have two parties A,B with registers A,B and an extra register R with dimR = (dimA+
dimB). The input state is denoted ρin ∈ D(A⊗B⊗R), where D(A) is the set of all possible quantum states
in register A. We also denote with L(A) the set of linear mappings from A to itself, and the superoperator
φ : L(A)→ L(B) that is completely positive and trace preserving, is called a quantum operation. We denote
IA the identity operator in register A. The ideal output is then given by ρout = (U ⊗ IR) · ρin, where
for simplicity we write U · ρ instead of UρU†. For two states ρ0, ρ1 we denote the trace norm distance
∆(ρ0, ρ1) :=
1
2‖ρ0 − ρ1‖. If ∆(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  then any process applied on ρ0 behaves as for ρ1 except with
probability at most .
Definition 2 (taken from [5]). A n-step two party strategy with oracle calls is denoted ΠO = (A,B,O, n):
1. input spaces A0,B0 and memory spaces A1, · · · ,An and B1, · · · ,Bn
2. n-tuple of quantum operations (LA1 , · · · , LAn ) and (LB1 , · · · , LBn ) such that LAi : L(Ai−1) → L(Ai) and
similarly for LBi .
3. n-tuple of oracle operations (O1, · · · ,On) where each oracle is a global operation for that step, Oi :
L(Ai ⊗ Bi)→ L(Ai ⊗ Bi)
7The trivial oracle is a communication oracle, that transfers some quantum register from one party to
another. Protocols that have only such oracles are called bare model. Other oracles include calls to other
cryptographic primitives. The quantum state in each step of the protocol is given by:
ρ1(ρin) := (O1 ⊗ I)(LA1 ⊗ LB1 ⊗ I)(ρin)
ρi+1(ρin) := (Oi+1 ⊗ I)(LAi+1 ⊗ LBi+1 ⊗ I)(ρi(ρin)) (1)
The security definitions are based on the ideal functionality of two party quantum computation (2PQC)
that takes a joint input ρin ∈ A0⊗B0, obtains the state U ·ρin and returns to each party their corresponding
quantum registers. A protocol ΠOU implements the protocol securely, if no possible adversary in any step of
the protocol, can distinguish whether they interact with the real protocol or with a simulator that has only
access to the ideal functionality. When a party is malicious we add the notation “∼”, e.g. A˜.
Definition 3 (Simulator). S(A˜) = 〈(S1, · · · ,Sn), q〉 is a simulatore for adversary A˜ in ΠOU if it consists of:
1. operations where Si : L(A0)→ L(A˜i),
2. sequence of bits q ∈ {0, 1}n determining if the simulator calls the ideal functionality at step i (qi = 1
calls the ideal functionality).
Similarly for the other adversaries.
Given input ρin the simulated view for step i is defined as:
νi(A˜, ρin) := TrB0 ((Ti ⊗ I)(Uqi ⊗ I) · ρin) (2)
and similarly for the other party.
Definition 4 (Privacy). We say that the protocol is δ-private if for all adversaries and for all steps i:
∆(νi(A˜, ρin),TrBi(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin))) ≤ δ (3)
where ρ˜i(A˜, ρin) the state of the real protocol with corrupted party A˜, at step i.
In classical cryptography a type of adversary commonly considered, is the “honest-but-curious”. This
adversary follows the protocol but also keeps records of their actions and attempts to learn from those
more than what they should. This type of weak adversary has been proven very useful in many protocols,
since it typically constitutes the first step in constructing protocols secure against more powerful (even fully
malicious) adversaries.
Since quantum states cannot be copied, one cannot have a direct analogue of honest-but-curious. Instead,
we have the notion of specious adversaries [5], where they can deviate as they wish, but in every step, if
requested, should be able to reproduce the honest global state by acting only on their subsystems. More
formally:
Definition 5 (Specious). An adversary A˜ is -specious if there exists a sequence of operations (T1, · · · , Tn),
where Ti : L(A˜i)→ L(Ai) such that:
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I)(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)), ρi(ρin)
)
≤  (4)
Note, that this (standard) definition of specious adversary, allows for different interpretations that lead to
stronger and weaker versions of the adversary. These subtleties are explained in Appendix B. Here we stress
that we take the weaker notion that takes Eq. (4) in the stricter sense, while in [5] the authors implicitly
used a stronger version. This difference led to our paper evading certain impossibility results mentioned in
[5]. A detailed discussion of this is given in Appendix B.
A 2PQC protocol needs to be (by definition) private. Moreover, it may (or may not) have two extra
properties, verification and fairness. Verification means that each party, when they receive their output,
not only are sure that nothing leaked about their input, but also they can know whether the outcome they
received is correct or corrupted. Fairness is the extra property that no party should be able to obtain their
output and after that cause an abort (or a corruption) for the other party. Even in classical 2PC, it is
impossible to have fairness against fully malicious adversaries (without any extra assumption). We consider
two-party protocols Π0 = (C, S,O, n) where C denotes the client and S the server.
8III. SECURE TWO-PARTY QUANTUM COMPUTATION (QYAO)
The first extension of VUBQC that we will explore, is to use it in order to construct a 2PQC protocol
similar to classical Yao protocol of [4], that we refer to as QYao, with the sender-garbler being the client, and
the receiver-evaluator being the server. As in Yao protocol, we assume that the client, when adversarial, is
specious, however, we make no such assumption for the server, that is assumed to be fully malicious. In [4]
the server needs to use OT in order to insert their input. We, instead, use a scheme to insert the quantum
input that requires no such functionality. The reason this is possible, is because we make the assumption
that the client is specious and in specific situations a specious adversary is weaker than honest-but-curious
(see Appendix B 1). For the specific case of classical input/output, one can modify our protocol to make
it secure against classical honest-but-curious adversary, by replacing the input injection subprotocol (see
below) with OT.
Our QYao protocol provides a one-time verifiable 2PQC similar to the classical setting as recently shown
for the original Yao protocol in [37]. The speciousness of the client restricts any possible deviations on their
side, while a malicious server would be detected through the hidden traps of the VUBQC protocol. The
blindness property of VUBQC also guarantees that the server learns nothing before the client is certain that
there was no deviation and returns the suitable keys for the decryption of the output.
The major differences that QYao protocol has in comparison with regular VUBQC [3] is that the server
needs to provide (part of) the input and at the end keeps (part of) the output. There are multiple ways
to modify the VUBQC protocol, we use a direct approach at the cost of having two rounds of quantum
communication during input preparation and two rounds of quantum communication during output read-
out. However, there is no quantum communication during the evaluation stage. Note that if we restrict the
protocol to classical input/output, we would avoid all quantum communication apart from the initial and
offline sending of pre-rotated qubits from the client to the server (but we would then need OT, as in the
classical Yao, for the server to insert their input).
A. Server’s input injection
The qubits composing the DT(G), (see Figure 1), are prepared by the client, this is crucial in order to
ensure that the server is blind about the positions of the traps. However, the server should somehow insert
their input in the DT(G). We present here, for simplicity, the case that there is a single qubit input, but it
generalises trivially. To do so, the server encrypts their input using secret keys (mz,i,mx,i) and sends the
state Xmx,iZmz,i |ΦS〉 to the client, to insert it randomly in the corresponding base-location. The state |ΦS〉
is assumed to be pure as we have included its purification in the hands of the server. The client, encrypts
further the server’s input by applying an extra random Z(θ′i) and an X
x′i correction to obtain the state:
Xx
′
iZ(θ′i)X
mx,iZmz,i |ΦS〉 (5)
This extra encryption is needed in order to hide the future actual measurement of the input qubit (to be
performed by the server) and ensure that no information about the position of the traps is leaked. Trap
hiding also requires the client to return two extra qubits for the input insertion (see Figure 2) that will
belong to trap graphs (called the white-graph and black-graph). The white qubit is a trap is prepared in a
state |θk〉 while the black qubit is dummy and is prepared in state |dj〉. The three qubits will be randomly
permuted by the client so that the server does not know which qubit is which. A similar procedure (with no
communication from the server) is applied for client’s input qubits, as well as for all the qubits corresponding
to the gate computation (see Figure 2).
Finally, after the server has received all the qubits, announces the secret keys (mx,i,mz,i) for each in-
put i to the client, so that the client can update the encryption for these qubits and have (xi, θi) :=
(x′i +mx,i, (−1)mx,iθ′i + pimz,i). With the updated encryption, the client computes the suitable measure-
ment angles δi. It is worth pointing out that the key releasing step from server to client could be avoided, by
using classical OT to compute the measurement angles as a function of the secret parameters of the server
δi(mx,i,mz,i) for the first two layers (that have dependency on mx,i,mz,i). While this could be necessary
for future work, to construct protocols dealing with malicious client, it is not necessary for our case where
the client is considered to be specious.
9Figure 2. Server gives their input (blue) and client chooses (randomly) where in the input base-location to place
the input. The random choice is highlighted. The trap-colouring is filled correspondingly, after the random choice is
made.
Protocol 3 Server’s Input Injection
Setting:
• The server has input |ΦS〉 that corresponds to specific positions IS of the input layer of the base-graph. For each i
qubit, server chooses pair of secret bits (mx,i,mz,i).
Instructions:
1. The server sends to the client the states Xmx,iZmz,i |ΦS〉 for all i ∈ IS .
2. The client prepares all the states of the DT(G) as in Protocol 1 (see [3]) apart from the computation qubits of
the server’s input.
3. The client chooses at random x′i, θ
′
i for each of the server’s input and obtains the states:
Xx
′
iZ(θ′i)X
mx,iZmz,i |ΦS〉.
4. The client mixes the computation qubit of the server’s input, with a dummy and a trap qubit to return the
three qubits of server’s input base-locations.
5. The server, after receiving the qubits, returns to the client the secret bits (mx,i,mz,i) for all i of their input.
6. The client computes xi := x
′
i + mx,i and θi := (−1)mx,iθ′i + pimz,i and uses these (xi, θi) for computing the
measurement angles as in Protocol 1.
Outcome:
• The server receives a DT(G), where the quantum input is the joint input of the client and server and the related
measurement angles instructions perform the desired unitary, if the client is honest.
B. Server’s output extraction
In the regular VUBQC protocol, the server returns all the output qubits to the client. The client measures
the final layer’s traps to check for any deviation and then obtains the output of the computation by decrypting
the output computation qubits using their secret keys. In the 2PQC, part of the output (of known base-
locations) should remain in the hands of the server. This, however, would not allow the client to check for
the related traps (that could have effects on other output qubits). Similar to the input injection, the solution
is obtained via an extra layer of encryption by server followed by a delayed key releasing. The server will
encrypt using two classical bits (kx, kz): Ek(|ψ〉) = XkxZkz |ψ〉, all the output qubits that correspond to
server’s output base-locations and then return all the output qubits to the client. Due to the encryption,
the client obtains no information about the output of the server while now has access to all the final trap
qubits for the verification. The client returns to the server, only the computation qubits corresponding to
server’s output base-locations, while keeping the traps and all the qubits from other base-locations. The
server reveals their keys (note that the client, being specious, has not kept the computation output qubits,
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because it would be impossible to reconstruct the ideal state by acting only on their systems). The client
checks all the traps, and if all of them are correct, reveals the final computation output keys to the server
(θi, ri). The server undoes the padding to reveal their output.
Protocol 4 Server’s Output Extraction
Setting:
• The server has the state TrC(|ψ(f)〉) at the corresponding positions OS of their output base-locations of the DT(G).
For each i qubit, server chooses pair of secret bits (mx,i,mz,i).
Instructions:
1. The server sends to the client the states Xmx,iZmz,i TrC(|ψ(f)〉) for all i ∈ OS .
2. The client keeps the qubits that correspond to traps and dummies in the final layer of server’s output, while
returns the computation qubits of server’s output.
3. The server returns to the client (mx,i,mz,i).
4. The client checks the traps and if correct returns to the server the final layer paddings for their output locations
(θi, ri, rj<i) and (mx,i,mz,i) (that the server sent earlier).
5. The server undoes the final layer paddings and obtains the output.
Outcome:
• The server obtains the computation qubits of their output base-locations unpadded TrC(U(|Ψ〉C , |Φ〉S)).
C. The QYao protocol
We combine Protocol 3 and 4 with the core VUBQC, Protocol 1, to obtain a secure two-party protocol to
compute unitaries given as Protocol 5.
Protocol 5 Secure 2PQC - QYao
Input:
• The client and server know the unitary operator U that they wish to compute. The client has a description of
U in MBQC using resource |G〉, and maps it to the DT(G) (see Protocol 1 and [3]). For each qubit the client
knows the angles φi and dependencies. The base-locations of the inputs and outputs of both parties are public.
The inputs of client and server are denoted correspondingly as |Ψ〉C and |Φ〉S .
Output:
• The client receives the subset Co of the output qubits of the final quantum state U(|Ψ〉C , |Φ〉S).
• The server receives the subset So of the output qubits of the final quantum state U(|Ψ〉C , |Φ〉S).
The protocol
1. Client sends all qubits of the DT(G) (choosing the random parameters ri, θi, di and trap-colouring), where for
base-locations that corresponds to the server’s input, the input injection Protocol 3 is used.
2. Server and client follow the verification protocol 1 until the step that the output is returned.
3. Client and server interact according to Protocol 4 so that the server extracts their own output.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). If both client and server follow the steps of Protocol 5 then the output is correct
and the computation accepted
Proof. If client and server follow Protocol 5, after Step 1, where the server injected their input, we are in
exactly the same situation as in Protocol 1, with (overall) input ρin = |Ψ〉C ⊗ |Φ〉S .
During Step 2, client and server run exactly Protocol 1 and correctness follows from [3]. The positions of
dummies result in having isolated traps measured in correct basis and thus there is never an abort. From the
remaining qubits, one copy of the dotted base-graph G, where the measurement pattern MComp is applied,
results to the state EkS ,kC (U · ρin). This is the honest global final state, encrypted with keys of both the
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client (secret parameters) and the server (the padding (mx,i,mz,i) from the output extraction protocol, which
applies to server’s output registers only).
During Step 3, the client keeps the registers of their output, while returns the registers of the server’s
output. The protocol finishes with the server returning their keys (mx,i,mz,i) to the client (to check for
traps), while the client returns the keys (secret parameters) involved with the final decryption of the server’s
output registers.
Due to the simple composition of input injection and output extraction the verification property of our
QYao is directly inherited from the VUBQC. We prove this first, before presenting and proving the main
privacy property of the QYao protocol in the next section (which exploits the verifiability).
Definition 6. We define a 2PQC protocol to be -verifiable for the client, if for any (potentially mali-
cious) server, the probability of obtaining a corrupt output and not abort is bounded by . The output of the
real protocol with malicious server S˜ is ρ˜(S˜, ρin) and we have:
∆(ρ˜(S˜, ρin), ρideal(ρ
′
in)) ≤  (6)
where
ρideal(ρin) := pok(IHC ⊗ CHS ) · U · (ρin) + (1− pok)(|fail〉 〈fail|)
and CHS is the deviation that acts on the server’s systems after they receive their outcome (a CP-map, but
can be purified if we include ancilla). Also ρ′in = (IHC ⊗ DHS ) · ρin is an initial state compatible with the
client’s input, with DHS the deviation on the input by the server.
We should note, that the server can always choose any input from their side, and the security of the
protocol is defined with respect to this “deviated” input. Moreover, since the deviation CHS is performed at
the final step of the protocol, we also have that the global state (before that deviation, i.e. at step n − 1)
obeys:
∆(ρ˜n−1(S˜, ρin), ρn−1ideal(ρ
′
in)) ≤  (7)
where
ρn−1ideal(ρin) := pokU · (ρin) + (1− pok)(|fail〉 〈fail|)
Theorem 2 (-verification for client). Protocol 5 is -verifiable for the client, where  =
(
8
9
)d
and d =
d δ2(2c+1)e, c is the maximum degree of the base graph and δ is the number of errors tolerated on the base
graph G.
Proof. In order to prove the verifiability for the client, we assume that the client is honest, while the server
is malicious.
During Step 1 of Protocol 5, the server sends their input and also gives the keys of the one-time-padding
encryption (mx,i,mz,i) from the input injection phase. It follows, that any deviation on these affects only
the computation qubits of the server’s input base-location, in other worlds resulting to a state: ρ′in =
(IHC ⊗DHS ) · ρin
During Step 2, the protocol proceeds exactly as the VUBQC, Protocol 1, with only difference that the
qubits with base-location of the server’s output, have an extra encryption with keys known to the server.
This means that the client delays the measurement of the traps in those base-locations, until the next step,
where they receive from the server these keys. Note, however, that the client can already check all the past
traps and the ones corresponding to base-location of the clients output.
In Step 3, the server returns the keys (mx,i,mz,i) for all their output base-locations qubit, and also
receives the computation qubits of those base-locations encrypted with both the client’s and server’s keys.
Any deviation by the server at this stage, either returns different (wrong) keys to the client, or acts only on
the server’s output. Returning wrong keys increases the chance of abort, but in any case, it is equivalent
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with this deviation happening before the return of the output to the server. The only remaining, extra,
deviation is a possible deviation acting on the computation output qubits of the server, i.e. a deviation of
the form (IHC ⊗ CHS ).
It follows, that this protocol has the same verification properties with Protocol 1, with the modified input
and (server’s-part) of output given by Eq. (6). From [3] we have that Protocol 1 is -verifiable with  =
(
8
9
)d
and d = d δ2(2c+1)e, and this completes the proof.
It is worth mentioning, that this verification property essentially restricts the server to behave similarly
with a specious adversary, with the extra ability to abort the protocol.
IV. PROOF OF PRIVACY OF THE QYAO PROTOCOL
Recall that we defined a protocol to be secure if no possible adversary in any step of the protocol, can
distinguish whether they interact with the real protocol or with a simulator that has access only to the ideal
functionality (see Definition 4).
Theorem 3. The QYao protocol, Protocol 5, that is 1-verifiable for the client, is O(
√
2)-private against
an 2-specious client and 1-private against a malicious server.
To prove the theorem we need to introduce simulators for each step of the protocol and each possible
adversary. Below we define those simulators and prove that they are as close to the real protocol as requested
from Theorem 3. Since in our setting the two parties have different roles and maliciousness we consider the
simulators for each party separately.
A. Client’s simulators
The client is -specious and this means that for each step i there exist a map Ti : L(HV˜i)→ L(HVi), that
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I)(ρ˜i(V˜ , ρin)), ρi(ρin)
)
≤  (8)
Following the proof of the “Rushing Lemma” of [5], we obtain a similar lemma for each step of the protocol,
where it shows that there is no extra information stored in the ancilla’s of the specious adversary:
Lemma 1 (No-extra Information). Let ΠU = (A,B, n) be a correct protocol for two party evaluation of U .
Let A˜ be any -specious adversary. Then there exists an isometry Ti : A˜i → Ai⊗ Aˆ and a (fixed) mixed state
ρˆi ∈ D(Aˆi) such that for all joint input states ρin,
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I)(ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)), ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin)
)
≤ 12
√
2 (9)
where ρi(ρin) is the state in the honest run and ρ˜i(A˜, ρin) is the real state (with the specious adversary A˜).
Proof. This proof follows closely the proof of the “rushing lemma” of [5], where one can find further details.
For simplicity we assume pure ρin (where it holds in general by convexity). Consider two different states
|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 in A0 ⊗ B0 ⊗R, and we extend the space R′ = R⊗R2 with R2 = span{|0〉 , |1〉}. We define the
state |ψ〉 = 1/√2(|ψ1〉 |1〉+ |ψ2〉 |2〉). Due to the speciousness of A˜ and using Ulmann’s theorem, there is an
isometry Ti : A˜i → Ai ⊗ Aˆ and a state ρ˜ ∈ D(Aˆ) such that
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I) · ρ˜i(A˜, ψ), ρ˜⊗ ρi(ψ)
)
≤ 2
√
2 (10)
The state ρ˜ in general is not independent of the input ψ so there are few more steps required. By noting
that projection and partial trace are trace non-increase maps (by projecting on |1〉 subspace and tracing out
the R′ subspace), we obtain:
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∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I) · ρ˜i(A˜, ψ1), ρ˜⊗ ρi(ψ1)
)
≤ 4
√
2 (11)
and similarly for ψ2. We repeat the same using ψ1, ψ3 and with initial state |ψ′〉 = 1/
√
2(|ψ1〉 |1〉+ |ψ3〉 |2〉)
and obtain:
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I) · ρ˜i(A˜, ψ1), ρ˜′ ⊗ ρi(ψ1)
)
≤ 4
√
2 (12)
By the triangular inequality we get ∆(ρ˜, ρ˜′) ≤ 8√2. This means that for any state |χ〉, there exists a state
ρˆ ∈ Aˆ with ∆(ρ˜, ρˆ) ≤ 8√2 such that:
∆
(
(Ti ⊗ I) · ρ˜i(A˜, χ), ρˆ⊗ ρi(χ)
)
≤ 4
√
2 (13)
and the Lemma follows by using once more the triangle inequality.
Before introducing the simulators we give some intuitive arguments. The client, during the input-injection
step, receives a fully one time padded quantum state, while in later steps (up until the last) has no legitimate
quantum state (all the quantum states are in the server’s side). Therefore, using the above Lemma, we can
already see that the client has no information about the actual quantum state during any step before the
last. This is illustrated by the fact that the simulators for these steps can run the honest protocol with a
random (but fixed) input and the client’s view is the same (they cannot distinguish a run with the correct
or different input in any step before the last). The simulator for the final step (after receiving the quantum
states from the server) is more subtle, as it necessarily involves a call to the ideal functionality.
Proof. of Theorem 3.
Simulator upon receiving server’s encoded input: There is a full one time pad on server’s input,
thus a simulator can use a random fixed state ϕ∗ instead of the real state TrC(ρin) and the client cannot
distinguish them.
Simulator after returning server’s input and before receiving output: The simulator runs the
honest protocol using instead of ρin a fixed random input ϕ
∗. The honest state with input χ at this stage is:
ρi(χ):= (14)
(|ki〉 〈ki| ⊗ |bi〉 〈bi|)HC ⊗
(
Eki(σi(χ))⊗ |di〉 〈di| ⊗ |+θti 〉 〈+θti |
)
HS
where σi(χ) is the evolution of the input state, when the gates corresponding to the ith step have been
performed (here we collectively call the secret parameters used to encrypt the state in each step as ki).
Later, we will be more specific about the different secret parameters. Also di, θti are the dummy and trap
qubits of the ith layer (we can include the qubits of future layers as well with no difference in the remaining
argument). It is easy to see that the reduced state on the client’s side HC is independent from the input
state χ. The simulator is then constructed:
1. The simulator runs the protocol with fixed but random input ϕ∗, to obtain ρi(ϕ∗).
2. The simulator obtains the fixed state ρˆi and the isometry Ti, that both are independent of the input.
3. The simulated view is then defined to be:
νi(C˜, ρin) := TrHSi
(
(T †i ⊗ I)(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ϕ∗))
)
(15)
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We can easily see that
νi(C˜, ρin) = TrHSi
(
(T †i ⊗ I)(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin))
)
= TrHSi
(
(T †i ⊗ I)(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ϕ∗))
)
as T †i does not acts on HSi and thus commutes with the partial trace, while tracing-out HSi leaves the
reduced state independent from the input (see Eq. (14)). Since isometries leave invariant the trace-distance,
while partial trace is non-increasing, we use Eq. (9) and we have
∆
(
TrHSi
(
ρ˜i(C˜, ρin)
)
, νi(C˜, ρin)
)
≤ 12
√
2 (16)
Simulator after receiving client’s output: First we need to introduce some notation and conventions:
• By kS , kC we define the padding of the server’s and client’s output respectively. In more detail these
keys are functions of the trap-colouring (trap positions) of the last layer, the rotations θ, the secret
parameters r’s and measurement results b’s of the previous two layers. We collectively denote the rest,
i.e. all the other secret keys, as kR.
• We also assume that the classical measurement outcomes b’s are in the Hilbert space of the client, while,
being classical and public, could be copied to the server’s Hilbert space too (adding this copy does not
affect the client’s simulators and complicates the notation). Moreover, classical results corresponding
to trap measurements are denoted bt, while other are simply b. The trap measurements outcomes (in
the honest run) are bt = rt where rt is one of the secret parameters included in k
R.
• The final layer (unmeasured) qubits are separated to: (i) output qubits (those are of the server and the
client, and it includes the purification of their inputs), (ii) dummy qubits collectively denoted dS , dC
for server/client unmeasured dummies and (iii) trap qubits denoted as θSt , θ
C
t . The dummies and trap
qubits are in tensor product to the rest (in the honest run).
• The Hilbert spaces containing the output qubits (and the related purification of honest run) are denoted
HSo ,HCo , while the remaining qubits are HS ,HC .
• For brevity we denote [b] := |b〉 〈b| and similarly for the other states.
With the above notations, the honest run of the protocol at this step, with some input χ is:
ρi(χ) =
(
EkCi ,kSi (U(χ))
)
HCo⊗HSo
⊗ ([kS ]⊗ [kC ]⊗ [kR]⊗ [b]⊗ [bt]⊗ [dC ]⊗ [θCt ])HC
⊗ ([dS ]⊗ [θSt ])HS (17)
We define:
%(χ, kC , kS) :=
(
EkCi ,kSi (U(χ))
)
HCo⊗HSo
σ :=
(
[kS ]⊗ [kC ]⊗ [kR]⊗ [b]⊗ [bt]⊗ [dC ]⊗ [θCt ]
)
HC ⊗
(
[dS ]⊗ [θSt ]
)
HS
ρi(χ) = %(χ, k
C , kS)⊗ σ (18)
It is worth pointing-out that σ is independent from the input χ. Now the simulator is constructed in the
following steps:
1. The simulator obtains from the client the choice of secret keys kC , kS , kR (that can be viewed as part
of the client’s input).
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2. The simulator sets bt = rt. For the other measurement outcomes b, the simulator chooses randomly
a bit value. To ensure that the b’s obtained are indistinguishable from the real honest protocol, the
simulator can run the full protocol with some random input ϕ. Since in the honest run, the values of
b’s do not depend on (are not correlated to) the input, the outcomes that the simulator returns would
be indistinguishable from those of a run with the correct input. Finally, speciousness ensures that this
state is also close to the real protocol.
3. The simulator, using the previous steps, constructs the state σ.
4. The simulator uses the state ρˆi from Lemma 1 for the ith step, which is a fixed state (independent of
the input).
5. The simulator calls the ideal functionality and receives the state TrHSo (ρi(ρin)).
6. The simulator uses the keys and the state received from the ideal functionality and constructs
TrHSo
(
%(ρin, k
C , kS)
)
.
7. The simulator obtains the operator Ti from the definition of specious, and constructs the isometry Ti
acting from HC˜ → HC ⊗HCˆ .
8. The simulated view is then:
ν(C˜, ρin) := TrHS
(
(T †i ⊗ I)
(
ρˆi ⊗ TrHSo
(
%(ρin, k
C , kS)
)⊗ σ)) (19)
It is clear, that in all this construction, ρin appears only through TrHSo (ρi(ρin)), which is the ideal output
of the client. Now we prove that this simulated view is δ-close to the view of the client in the real protocol.
We start from Eq. (9) and we obtain:
∆
(
TrHS ,HSo
(
ρ˜i(C˜, ρin)
)
,TrHS ,HSo
((
T †i ⊗ I
)
(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin))
))
≤ 12
√
2
Now, since T †i does not act on either of the server’s Hilbert spaces, it commutes with the partial trace. We
can then see that:
ν(C˜, ρin) = TrHS ,HSo
((
T †i ⊗ I
)
(ρˆi ⊗ ρi(ρin))
)
(20)
and this concludes the first part of the proof as we have a (12
√
2)-private protocol.
B. Server’s simulators
Our QYao protocol is secure against a fully malicious server that can deviate in any possible way and can
also cause an abort. We will use the fact that QYao protocol is -verifiable for the client, i.e. Eq. (6) and
Eq. (7) hold. In many classical protocols, to prove security against malicious adversaries one has to restrict
their actions to essentially honest-but-curious adversaries. Here the verification property plays such a role,
as the condition obtained can be used in a similar way as the speciousness of the client.
We can see that, before the client sends the secret parameters, the server is totally blind, i.e. the server’s
reduced state at all times is the totally mixed state (for all qubits in the DT(G), including their own input
qubits, after they are injected). This is highlighted by the fact that one can run the full protocol (before
releasing the keys), without choosing the (client’s) input (see simulator below). After receiving the keys from
the client, to simulate the server’s view we need a call to the ideal functionality, and at this point to use Eq.
(6).
Continuation of the proof of Theorem 3.
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Simulator before receiving keys: The simulator, instead of sending qubits in one of these states
{|+θ〉 , |0〉 , |1〉}, sends one side of an EPR pair |ψ〉 = 1√2 (|01〉 + |10〉) for each qubit to the server. Then
chooses an angle δi at random for each of the measurement angles. The simulator can measure (if they wish)
their qubits (of the EPR pairs) in suitable way and angles that inserts any input they wish and performs any
computation. This can be done after all measurements of the server have taken place (see [18]). It follows
that the server cannot obtain any information about the client’s input.
Simulator after receiving keys: The simulator is constructed using the following steps:
1. Simulator prepares multiple Bell states |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉). Sends the one qubit of each pair to the
server and instructs them to entangle the qubits as they would in the normal protocol.
2. Simulator for each qubit chooses randomly an angle δi and instructs the server to measure in this angle.
3. Simulator obtains from the server’s (malicious) strategy the parameter pok (see Eq. (6)).
4. With probability (1− pok) the simulator returns abort. Otherwise performs the remaining steps.
5. Simulator calls the ideal functionality and obtains the state TrHC (U(ρ
′
in)), where ρ
′
in = (IHC⊗DHS )·ρin
is the deviated input that the corrupted server inputs.
6. The simulator encrypts the outcome using kS , and sends the output qubits of the server back in the
state: EkS (TrHC (U(ρ
′
in)))
7. The simulator returns the keys kS to the server.
The last step of the protocol is that the server decrypts their output, which we denote as DkS (·), where
DkS (EkS (·)) = I. It follows, that the server’s view of the real protocol after the key exchange is:
TrHC
(
EkS
(
ρ˜n−1(S˜, ρ′in)
))
(21)
From Eq. (7) we obtain
∆
(
TrHC
(
EkS
(
ρ˜n−1(S˜, ρin)
))
,TrHC
(
EkS (ρ
n−1
ideal(ρ
′
in))
)) ≤  (22)
as partial trace is distance non-increasing operation. Using the definition of ρn−1ideal(ρ
′
in) from Eq. (7) we see
that
TrHC
(
EkS (ρ
n−1
ideal(ρ
′
in))
)
= TrHC (EkS (pokU · (ρ′in) + (1− pok)(|fail〉 〈fail|)))
TrHC
(
EkS (ρ
n−1
ideal(ρ
′
in))
)
= ν(P˜ , ρin) (23)
We have now proved that the simulated view is -close to the real view of the server, just after the key
exchange, and thus proving that the protocol is -private against malicious server S˜.
V. NON-INTERACTIVE QYAO
Following the classical approach of [6] we exploit our QYao protocol to construct one-time program. To
do so we simply need to remove the classical online communication of the QYao protocol using the classical
hardware primitive of secure “one-time memory” (OTM), which is essentially a non-interactive oblivious
transfer. The obtained one-time quantum programs can be executed only once, where the input can be
chosen at any time. Classically the challenge in lifting the Yao protocol for two-party computation to one-
time program, was the issue of malicious adversary. However, our QYao protocol is already secure against a
malicious evaluator without any extra primitive or added overhead.
Recall that the interaction in our QYao is required for two reasons. First, from the server’s perspective
this is done to obtain the measurement angles δi that perform the correct computation, while these could not
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be computed offline as they depend on the measurement outcomes bj<i of certain qubits measured before i
but after the preparation stage (and on secret parameters (θi, ri, rj<i, T ) and computation angle φi that are
known from start). Second, from the client’s perspective, the results of measurements are needed to provide
with a “proof” that the output is correct, by testing for deviation from the trap outcomes.
Removing the interaction: An obvious solution for the first issue raised, is to have the client compute
δi for all combinations of previous outcomes bj<i, and then store in an OTM the different values, while the
server chooses and learns the entry of the OTM corresponding to the outcomes obtained. This solution,
at first, appears to suffer from an efficiency issue as one may think that for each qubit the client needs to
compute δi for all combination of past outcomes which grows exponentially (as would the size of the OTM
used). However, a closer look in the dependencies of corrections in MBQC for the typical graphs used, shows
that the measurement angle of qubit i depends on at most a constant number of qubits, being within the
two previous “layers” (past neighbours or past neighbours of past neighbours). This is evident from the flow
construction [38, 39], that guarantees that corrections can be done, and the explicit form of dependencies
involves only neighbours and next-to neighbours in the graph G. A flow is defined by a function (f : Oc → Ic)
from measured qubits to non-input qubits and a partial order () over the vertices of the graph such that
∀i : i  f(i) and ∀j ∈ NG(i) : f(i)  j, where NG(i) denotes the neighbours of i in G. Each qubit i is
X-dependent on f−1(i) and Z-dependent on all qubits j such that i ∈ NG(j).
Definition 7 (Past of qubit i). We define Pi = Zi∪Xi to be the set of qubits j that have X or Z dependency
on i.
Definition 8 (Influence-past of qubit i). We define influence-past ci, of qubit i to be an assignment of an
outcome bj ∈ {0, 1} for all qubits j ∈ Pi.
For each influence-past ci, there exists a unique value of δi(ci). While ci provides all the necessary
dependencies for the client to compute δi, this is not known to the server. This could be problematic, as
the server is expected to open the OTM using the past outcomes with a labelling consistent with their own
knowledge. The true dependencies depend on the actual flow of the computation, which is hidden from the
server, as the positions of dummies (that break the DT(G) to the three graphs) are not known to the server.
From here on we restrict attention to DT(G). This is resolved by defining:
Definition 9 (Extended-past of qubit i). We define the extended past EPi of qubit i to be the set of all
qubits that for some trap-colouring are in the past of i.
Similarly we define extended-influence-past (EIP) of qubit i (it is clear that δi has trivial dependency on
all outcomes of EIP that are not in the actual influence-past). The extended past has also finite cardinality,
as it is evident that the only qubits that can affect a qubit with base-location i are those that belong to
(the finite) base-locations that contain the qubits that have true dependency (i.e. neighbours or next-to
neighbours base-locations).
Ensuring verification: The interaction is also important from the clients perspective, in order to verify that
the server did not deviate. Again, naively one could suggest that the server can return all the measurement
outcomes at the end. However, this suffers from a potential attack (not present in normal VUBQC). The
underlying reason is that there is nothing to force the server to commit that the bi’s that will return are the
same as the ones used for selecting measuring angles. For example, the server measures qubit 1 at δ1, and
obtains b1 (which will be returned at the end) but uses b
′
1 = b1 ⊕ 1 when opening the OTM corresponding
to qubit j where 1 ∈ EPj . If qubit j is computation qubit, this leads to measuring at a wrong angle, while
if qubit j is trap qubit, it has no (real) dependence on b1 and thus the angle recovered is the correct one,
and the server never causes abort while corrupts the computation. To avoid this problem, we introduce a
method that uses some flag bit-string li.
The client provides for each qubit, the angle δi and a flag bit-string li of length m. This flag bit-string is
a (one-time-padded) flag, of whether a trap failed in the (extended) past of qubit i or not. At the final step
of the protocol, the server returns the final layer qubits and all the flags li. Here we will denote bj;i to mean
the outcome of qubit j measurement that the client uses for the computation of the measurement angle for
qubit i, i.e. the value of bj selected by the server when opening the ith OTM.
The client chooses uniformly at random, for each qubit i an m-bit string l0i , to denote that none of its past
qubits (j ∈ Pi) was a failed trap. The string l0i will be called “accept” flag, while all other strings li 6= l0i are
the “reject” flags. The OTM’s are prepared according to Protocol 6.
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Protocol 6 Preparation of OTM’s for non-interactive QYao
Description of OTM’s: We will use an (at most) one out of K OTM, where K = 2maxi |EPi|. Note, that the first
layer does not need an OTM, since (i) we give the angle directly (does not depend on anything) and (ii) there is
no trap in the previous layer and thus no need to give a flag. Moreover, for the last layer, while the qubits are not
measured (and thus there is no corresponding angle δ) we will use an OTM to obtain the last flags (that correspond
to testing traps in the previous layers).
• Labels of the cells of the OTM at i: Each qubit is labelled according to the outcomes of the extended past
qubits bj;i|j ∈ EPi, in other words according to the extended influence past ci.
• Content of the cells of the OTM at i: In each cell of the OTM we have a pair of numbers (δi, li), (that can
be viewed as a single string where the first three bits give δ and the remaining the flag). The δi is the unique
correct δ for the particular outcomes of past qubits bj |j ∈ Pi.
δi(ci) = (−1)s
Xi
i φi + θi + pi(ri ⊕ sZii ) (24)
The flag li depends on the outcomes bj of the extended past j ∈ EPi. In particular:
1. If for all traps t in the extended past of i, i.e. t ∈ EPi, bt;i = rt, we return l0i , i.e. accept flag.
2. Otherwise, we return a random string li 6= l0i , i.e. reject flag.
According to this protocol, the flag that the server obtains when opening the OTM at qubit i, is reject
if and only if in the extended past of this qubit there is a failed trap outcome. We can see that returning
a wrong outcome for some measurement bi, implies opening an entry of the OTM with wrong flag only if
the qubit is a trap one (as in regular VUBQC), while it still returns the accept flag if it is a dummy or
computation qubit. Here we should note, that even if the client knows that one flag is a reject flag (i.e. has
one particular li 6= l0i ), the probability of guessing the correct flag is only f := (2m− 1)−1. This, intuitively,
will force the client to return the flag obtained from the OTM (or abort with high probability), provided
that m is chosen suitably. We can now give the non-interactive QYao Protocol 7.
Protocol 7 Non-interactive QYao
Assumptions
Client and server want to jointly compute a unitary as in Protocol 5. The client has N OTM’s that are 1-out-of-K,
i.e. one OTM per qubit, with sufficient entries to store a pair of (δi, li) measurement angle and flag bit-string (of
length at least m ≥ log( 1

+ 1)), for each extended influence past of the qubit.
Protocol
1. Client and server interact according to Protocol 3 to obtain the server’s input locations. Client also sends the
qubits of DT(G) aftr choosing secret parameters (ri, θi, di and trap-colouring).
2. The client, for each qubit and each extended influence past, computes δi(ci). Then prepares one OTM per
qubit as described in Protocol 6.
3. Server performs the measurements according to the first layer of angles received δi (directly as in Protocol 3).
Then open the next layer OTM’s using the outcomes bi of their measurements. Uses the new measurement
angle revealed δj , while records the flag bit-string lj . Iterates until the last layer OTM is opened (and the
second last layer is measured). The final layer OTM’s return only a flag.
4. Server and client interact according to Protocol 4 so that the server obtains their output. The only difference
is that the client, before returning the keys, in order to accept checks the flags (instead of checking the trap
outcomes of measured qubits) and the final layer traps.
Theorem 4. Protocol 7 is -verifiable for the client, with  same as the VUBQC protocol that is used.
Proof. This proof consists of three stages. First, similarly to the proof of theorem 2, we show that the
verifiability for the client of the non-interactive QYao, reduces to the verifiability of the same VUBQC
protocol with modifications for the server’s input and output. The second stage is to observe that the
optimal strategy for an adversarial server is to return the flags from the opened OTM’s. This makes the
verifiability property for this protocol identical with an interactive protocol with the only modification that
the server can return different values for the measurement outcome bi depending on which future qubit
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the client needs the outcome (bi;j). The final stage, is to show that this modified (interactive) verification
protocol, is -verifiable with same  as Protocol 1.
Stage 1: Following the proof of theorem 2, we can see that the non-interactive QYao protocol 7 is -verifiable
for the client if the corresponding non-interactive VUBQC protocol that is used during step 3 of Protocol 7 is
-verifiable, with deviated input ρ′in and a final deviation (IHC ⊗CHS ) on the server’s output (computation)
qubits.
Stage 2: If the server attempts to guess a flag (given the extra knowledge of one bit-string li 6= l0i ), they
cause an abort with high probability (1 − f , where f := (2m − 1)−1). However, since by assumption
m ≥ log( 1 + 1), the probability of abort is so high that makes the protocol trivially verifiable, as it is -close
to the ideal state Eq. (6) with (1− pok) = (1− f ).
It follows that the adversary (trying to maximising their cheating chances) should return the flags found
in the OTMs. This is equivalent with an interactive VUBQC protocol, that (i) the server for each qubit i
returns multiple values of the measurement outcome bi;j , one for each j in the extended future qubit of i
and (ii) the client uses those outcomes to compute the δi’s and (iii) the client aborts only when they receive
at least one trap outcome wrong bt;j 6= rt for any j.
Stage 3: We should now show the -verifiability of the modified interactive VUBQC protocol described
above. The proof follows the same steps of the proof of verifiability of Protocol 1 in [3]. The first steps
exploit the blindness to reduce the possible attacks (of adversarial server) to convex combination of Pauli
attacks. Then it is noted, that since the computation is encoded in an error-correcting code (that corrects
up to δ/2 errors), there is a minimum number (d = d δ2(2c+1)e) of independent base-locations that need to be
corrupted to cause an error.
For the proof of verifiability, as in [2, 3], we make the assumption that if the minimum number of attacks
that could corrupt the computation occurs, then the computation is corrupted. This is clearly not true, but
is sufficient to provide a bound on the probability of corrupt and accept (which is the “bad” case, that the
server manages to cheat). Then, given this minimum number of attacks, the probability of abort is computed
and found to be greater than 1− , and thus the protocol is verifiable.
In our case, there is the difference that for each measured qubit bi of the original protocol, we have
multiple qubits bi;j . Once again, we make the assumption of minimum corrupted qubits, we need at least
d = d δ2(2c+1)e independent base-locations, and we can allow for each base-location to corrupt a single bi;j for
one specific j. However, this does not change the probability of hitting a trap, as it suffices to give wrong
value bt,j for one j to cause an abort. We then obtain again, that the probability of abort (in the minimum
corruptable attack) is at least (1− ), (for  = ( 89)d) and the protocol is indeed -verifiable.
Theorem 5. Protocol 7 that is 1-verifiable for the client, is O(
√
2)-private against an 2-specious client
and 1-private against a malicious server.
Proof. We need simulators for the client only during input injection and output extraction (since the client
does not participate in the evaluation phase, in the non-interactive protocol). During these steps, the
simulators are identical with those in Protocol 5.
The server’s simulators until before the output extraction, can be identical with the ones of Protocol 5,
where the interaction is replaced with the preparation of OTM’s. It is important to note that all OTM’s
can be constructed with no information about the client’s input and thus from the simulator. Finally, the
simulator for the final step of Protocol 5, needs to only use the property that the Protocol is -verifiable
for the client. We proved in Theorem 4 that this is the case for Protocol 7 and thus we can use the same
simulator.
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Appendix A: Measurement-based quantum computation
An MBQC pattern is fully characterised by the graph (representing the entangled state), default measure-
ment angles φi, an order of measurements (determined by the flow) and a set of corrections that determine
the actual measurement angle of each qubit (modify the default measurement angles with respect to previous
measurement outcomes).
For the brickwork state, or any subset of the square lattice state, the flow f(i) takes a qubit to the same
row next column. E.g. i = (k, l), then f(i) = (k + 1, l). Given a flow f(·), and measurement outcomes sj ,
the actual (corrected) measurement angle is given:
φ′i(φi, sj<i) := φi(−1)sf−1(i) + pi
∑
j|f(j)∈NG(i)\f(i)
sj (A1)
where NG(i) denotes the set of neighbours (in the graph) of vertex i. It is easy to see that the corrected angle
for qubit i has an X-correction (i.e. a (−1) factor before φi) from the one qubit f−1(i) and Z-corrections
(i.e. pi addition) from some neighbours of neighbours, which for the brickwork state is at most two (but in
any case are constant in number).
We present here diagrams taken from [1] showing how to translate a universal set of gates to the MBQC
measurement patterns using the brickwork graphs.
Finally, we note that in UBQC, the measurement angle that the client instructs the server to measure is
given: δi = φ
′
i(φi, bj<i) + θi + piri = C(i, φi, θi, ri, s)
Appendix B: On specious adversaries definitions
The definition of specious, as given by Eq. (4), includes ρi(ρin) which is the honest state in step i, for any
input state ρin. There are two subtle issues with what this means, (i) in relation with what are the possible
input states ρin, and (ii) in relation to whether the random secret parameters are considered “input of the
computation or not. If we take the most restrictive case, it leads to a very weak adversary. In [5], there are
some impossibility results, that stem from taking a (slightly) stronger form of this adversary. Here we see
separately these two issues and finally discuss the differences with [5].
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1. Restricting to classical inputs
The first important point is that we observe that a specious adversary, under certain conditions, could
be weaker than an honest-but-curious classical adversary. A specious adversary is allowed to do ac-
tions/operations, that for any (allowed) input, can be “undone” by actions on his side if there is an audit.
Now we consider a (trivial) example, that specious is weaker than classical honest-but-curious. Assume,
that as first step of a protocol, a party (that is specious adversary) A˜ receives a one-time-padded quantum
input Ek(|ψ〉S) of the other party. As second step, the A˜ returns the padded quantum state back. If the
input is considered to be a general (unknown) quantum state, a specious adversary cannot do the following
action before returning the system S:
(∧X)SAEk(|ψ〉S)⊗ |0〉A (B1)
There is no map that A˜ can apply to their private system/ancilla A alone, and obtain the correct state
ρi(ρin), because for a general Ek(|ψ〉S) the resulting joint state is entangled.
However, imagine that we are actually considering is a classical protocol which means that the input is in
computational basis, i.e. either |0〉 or |1〉. In that case, the ∧X simply copies the ciphertext Ek(|ψ〉S), which
is exactly the action that an honest-but-curious classical adversary can do. Note that in this specific case,
the resulting state is no longer an entangled state and thus could be recovered by acting only on system
S. Nonetheless, the definition of specious requires to recover the correct state at each step for any possible
input.
It is exactly because of this property (that specious under certain conditions is weaker than classical honest-
but-curious) that we can avoid using OT for inserting the input of the server (unlike the Yao protocol). In
generalisations where we will have stronger adversaries, we will once again need to have OT for the input
insertion.
2. About the secret random parameters
The second important subtlety of the specious definition, is related with the secret (random) parameters
that the adversary can choose. Specious adversaries should be able to recover the global state ρi(ρin) in any
step. However this definition may be somewhat ambiguous. In general, the quantum state in any step is also
function of secret random parameters of the two parties kA, kB , i.e. we have ρi(ρin, kA, kB). We can (and
generally do) treat the secret keys as part of the input of the two parties (i.e. part of ρin), but in this case
the specious adversary is essentially requested to reconstruct precisely the state ρi(ρin, kA, kB) at step i.
However, we can imagine an adversary A˜ that could reproduce the state ρi(ρin, k
′
A, kB) instead, i.e.
reproduce a state that would be correct for step i, if the secret parameter was k′A instead of the kA that was
given at the start. In this case, the adversary A˜ is not specious with the standard definition that we use.
On the other hand, intuitively, since kA is a secret parameter (not known by anyone but A˜ until this step),
it should not matter what is this value, and reproducing ρi(ρin, k
′
A, kB) should be sufficient for a version of
quantum honest-but-curious.
We will define strong specious adversary, to be the adversary that they are required to have CP maps Ti
acting only on their subsystem such that they can reproduce the state ρi(ρin, kA, kB) for at least one secret
key kA (not determined in advance, and thus of their choice).
We will again give a simple example to make the distinction of these two flavour of specious adversaries.
Imagine a protocol that a (strong or weak) specious adversary A˜ is supposed to return an unknown state
|ψ〉 padded with their key EkA(|ψ〉). A strong specious adversary can cheat by keeping the state |ψ〉 and
returning instead the one side of an EPR pair (and keep the other side). Then if an audit occurs, the
adversary can use their side of the EPR pair and teleport the state |ψ〉 back, where the resulting state at
the honest side is Ekm(|ψ〉), with km being (randomly) determined by the outcome of the Bell measurement
that teleports the state. A weak specious adversary, on the other hand, cannot do this. The state that is
supposed to be returned needs to be padded with the key kA that is fixed from the start of the protocol,
while km is randomly determined during the audit (by the Bell measurement outcome).
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3. Regarding secure SWAP no-go theorem
It is not difficult to see, that a protocol that is secure against the standard (weak) specious adversary can
be made secure against the strong specious adversary by modifying the protocol to request that in every step
a new random (secret) parameter appears, a commitment to its value is made. This means that requesting an
adversary to be weak specious is practically equivalent with strong specious adversary where commitments
are allowed.
Here it is worth mentioning, that in [5], while not explicitly stated, had their protocol secure against the
stronger version of specious adversaries (unlike our protocol). This difference in the definition of specious
adversaries (implicit assumption of the stronger adversaries) also resolves the apparent contradiction of our
result (no secure primitive needed) with their no-go theorem (a secure SWAP is needed for 2PQC even for
specious adversaries). As is mentioned in [5], their no-go would not hold if commitments were possible,
which is exactly what our weaker definition essentially permits.
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